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MEDICRAMBIEN POR: COMMANDER, PENTACON COUNTERINTELLICENCE PORCE

SWELECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

1. (W) Subsequent to the submission of the inclosed operations plan, the entire ICIP was critically reviewed. The result of this review was the termination of operations at installations and facilities where degree of sensitivity of the facility, or the type information developed did not justify the expanditure of resources.

2. (C) The QACSI Communications Section, while an extremely sensitive eigenst of QACSI, is staffed primarily with senior MCO's and a number of civilians who have been employed in the same area for considerable periods of time. The number of personnel employed in the Communications Section is approximately 30, and these individuals men the area on a 24 hour basis. They process large volumes of sail and messages each month and there is considerable pressure exerted continually to insure correspondence handling is correct. Considering the size of this element, and the working conditions under which they operate, the security of an ICIP is doubtful. Further, the pressures and frustrations could be expected to increase if there were any indications of the existence of an ICIP.

3. (c) The activities of this element have been examined, and other than the sensitivity of the facility, there is no indication as to why this element would be a more lucrative target for an ICIP than any other element in QACSI.

4. (U) The attached operations plan is not favorably considered became the target is not considered sufficiently appropriate for an ICI?.

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Signed

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E. R. THOMPSON


Brigadier General, GS Director of Intelligence Operations

i Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2005

HUMINT DIVISION 427 RECORD COPY





### OPERATIONAL PLAN

SUBJECT: Operations Plan, Internal

DATE:

5 November 1974

Counterintelligence Security Program, Office Chief of Staff

REPORT NO:

for Intelligence, The Pentagon,

washington, DC

PROJECT NO:

REFERENCES: (U)

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a. Chapter 5, Section III, USAINTC Regulation 381-100, 1 March 1974 (C)

b. Chapter 2, USAINTC Regulation 381-100-1, 8 February 1974 (S) ...

- c. DOD Directive 5100.49, dated 3 December 1965, Subject: Pentagon Counterintelligence Program.
- d. AR 381-115, dated 2 July 1969, Subject: Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
- e. AR 381-130, with changes 2-4, Subject: Counterintelligence Investigations, Supervision and Control.
- f. FM 30-17, dated January 1972, Subject: Counterintelligence Special Operations.
- g. FM 30-17A, dated February 1973, Subject: Counterintelligence Special Operations (C).
- h. AR 380-13, dated 30 September 1974, Subject: Acquisition and Storage of information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations.

1. (g) MISSION:

a. Requirement: The mission of the OACSI, Administrative Office, Communications Section is to process incoming and outgoing mail; provide mail pick-up and delivery; world wide attache pouch support via coordination with the State Department. The Communications Section also maintains a registered mail record; a TOP SECRET Control Office; and operates a NATO, SEATO and CENTO sub-registry. There are approximately twenty thousand messages per month up to and including collateral TOP SECRET handled by this section.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHOOLE OF EXHIBITIVE ORDER 11652

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
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- b. Objective: This operation will provide the ACSI with a concentrated, aggressive security service within the confines of the Pentagon Reservation, and will provide a fast factual reporting system of any imminence of activities which would necessitate immediate command action and possibly pose a direct threat to the security of OACSI Communications Section. In order to accomplish the objective of this operation, an effective and coordinated use of overt and covert counterintelligence sources and techniques will be implemented which are designed to detect, neutralize, and eliminate the following elements and factors which pose a direct threat to the security of the Communications Sections.
  - (1) Acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversion.
  - (2) Hostile foreign intelligence activities.
- (3) Disloyalty, disaffection, and other threats to the security of OACSI.
- (4) Character weakness, habits, or improper conduct which makes personnel assigned to the Communications Section vulnerable to coercion or blackmail.
- (5) Acts of the Communications Section personnel affiliated with anti-Army dissident organizations which seek to disrupt the maintenance of good order, discipline, and morale within the Pentagon.
- c. <u>Base of Operations</u>: Special Operations Section, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force/National Capital Region Field Office, 902d MI Group, Room BE 800, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310.

## 2(U)(c) PERSONNEL:

- a. Confidential Source Personnel: To be selected from personnel assigned to the Communications Section, OACSI.
- b. <u>US ARMY Intelligence Personnel</u>: The following personnel of PCF/NCR FO will function in the capacities indicated:
  - (1) Project Officer: CPT Kenneth R. Schlag
  - (2) Project Control Officer (PCO): CW2 Shawn M. Sandlin
  - (3) Alternate PCO: CW2 Leonard NMN Gross
  - (4) Project Liaison Officer (PLO): CPT Kenneth R. Schlag
  - (5) Alternate PLO: SFC George E. Perry
- 3. (C) COVER AND DOCUMENTATION: (SEE ANNEX A)





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- \* a. The ICIP rroject Officer and PLO will function in a completely overt manner. No attempt will be made to conceal their affiliation with military intelligence.
- b. The PCO will employ shallow cover in his contacts with confidential sources. He will not disclaim affiliation with US Army Intelligence, since to do otherwise would alarm prospective sources.

4(U)c) EXECUTION:

### a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) The ICIP will be implemented by using the coordinated employment of overt liaison contacts and confidential source(s). Only confidential sources will be used in this operation due to the small size of the target area.
- (2) A concerted effort will be exerted towards the collection of information concerning military personnel assigned to the Communications Section. Collection will not extend to non-DoD personnel. In the event any individual not affiliated with DoD is identified as posing a threat against the Cables Section, the provisions of reference h will apply and prompt coordination will be effected with the appropriate authority. Each individual and source involved in the conduct or control of the operation will be briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to counterintelligence activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD, reference h.
- (3) The PLO will be the point of contact between the ACSI and PCF. The PLO will present to the ACSI or his designated representative, a quarterly briefing on the progress of the operation. In the event the PLO receives information requiring immediate action by OACSI, the information will be released to the ACSI and the Commander, 902d MI Group. Such information will be sanitized or otherwise protected to insure continued operational viability and source utilization.
  - (4) Specific EEI to be pursued are:
- (a) Determine the existance of espionage, sabotage, or subversion within the target or directed against the target.
- (b) If espionage, sabotage, or subversion is known or suspected, identify the perpetrators, the nature and scope of their activities, their methods of operation, and the foreign or domestic organization controlling such activity.
- (c) Determine the prevalence of dissident activity within the target area, identify military or civilian personnel involved, and resolve whether such activity is supported or directed by elements outside the OACSI.

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- (d) Detect and report adverse suitability information. foreign contacts by Cables Branch military members, and other significant matters which may be exploited by hostile intelligence services.
- a. The following activities and types of individuals will be subjected to continuous and intensive counterintelligence coverage:
  - (1) Known or suspected security risks.
- (2) Persons who are known or suspected to associate with persons who are known or suspected members of hostile intelligence or subversive organizations.

### c. Implementation:

- (1) Overt Phase: The overt phase will begin immediately upon approval of this plan. Close liaison will be maintained with selected OACSI Staff and security personnel. The PLO will be primarily responsible for the spotting and assessment of prospective confidential sources. The spotting will be continuous throughout the operation so as to assure an adequate bank of prospective sources for possible covert utilization. The PLO will conduct the overt functions as necessary to include investigative activities and quarterly briefings concerning the status of the ICIP.
- (2) Covert Phase: The covert phase will be the responsibility of the PCO with the assistance of the Alternate PCO. This phase will include the exploitation of confidential sources who have been recruited from among the military personnel. The PCO is also responsible for vetting, recruitment, targeting, training, and disposition of confidential sources. The objective of this phase will be the development of, timely reporting of credible information relating to the detection, neutralization, or exploitation of factors or individuals who pose a direct threat to the security of the Cables Branch, and thus the United States.

### COMMUNICATIONS: (SEE ANNEX B)

- a. Communications between the Project Officer and PCO/PLO will be conducted almost exclusively through personal meetings; telephone will serve as an alternate.
- b. Primary communications with confidential sources will be through personal meetings at pre-selected safe sites in the Washington Metropolitan area, or the Pentagon.
- c. Alternate means of communications with confidential sources will be via US Mail, using Post Office boxes in the Arlington, Virginia area. A Post Office box may also be used by the confidential source, if circumstances at his residence indicate a possibility of other persons gaining access to his personal mail.

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d. Emergency means of communications from confidential sources to PCO will be by telephone to an existing unlisted telephone number located in the office of the Special Operations Section, PCF/NCR. After duty hours, the confidential source will leave a message for the PCO at a telephone located in the PCF. This telephone is manned 24 hours a day, and night personne will be briefed concerning their actions should a source telephone and ask to speak to the PCO. The source will be asked to leave his name (cover name) and a telephone number where he may be reached. PCF night personnel will then immediately pass the information to the PCO, or if the PCO is unavailable the alternate PCO. From PCO to source, emergency communications will be by telephone call to sources home or office, as appropriate.

## 6 (Lite) TRAINING:

Training of confidential sources will be continuing process and a portion of each meeting will be devoted to instruction. Emphasis will be placed on security of the operation and the source and reporting procedures. Observation and description, targeting, and related subjects based on source's role will also be included. Each indivudual and source involved in the conduct of the operation will be briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to counterintelligence operations and activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD, Reference h. The training administered to source(s) will be in the quantity necessary to develop the maximum information from the target comensurate with the previous intelligence and experience of source(s).

7. % FINANCE AND LOGISTICS: (SEE ANNEX C)

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8. (C) TERMINATION: (SEE ANNEX D)

- a. Confidential sources recruited under this plan will be terminated when their usefulness to the plan ceases, when they show indicators of insecure security practices which would jeopardize the operation, are no longer amenable to control, or when the operation is terminated by proper authority. Circumstances under which termination is effected will determine whether termination is with or without prejudice.
- b. The only commitments made to confidential sources employed in this operation will be assurance of personnel and job safety through anonymity, and of reimbursement of any legitimate expenses incurred during the operation.





- c. Knowledgeability of confidential sources will be limited to the following:
  - (1) Name and physical description of the PCO and Alternate PCO.
  - (2) Location of meeting sites as well as that of PCF.
- (3) Means of alternate and emergency contact with PCO: Namely the Post Office Box number(s) and the telephone number(s) where PCO may be contacted in the event of an emergency.
- (4) The approach method used by the PCO in his initial contact with confidential sources.
- d. As a control factor, confidential sources will be required to sign a statement evidencing their willingness to cooperate and attesting to the fact that all facets of security will be strictly adhered to. This will not be construed to be a contractual agreement, but will be used as a physhological instrument to enhance the security of the operation.
  - e. Security considerations are contained in ANNEX E.
- 9. (Lic)- COORDINATION AND LIAISON:

Liaison with designated OACSI officials and other appropriate Pentagon Agencies will routinely be effected the PLO.

- 10. (U) REPORTING:
- a. Formats for operational reports are contained in Chapter 5, Section III, USAINTC Regulation 381-100 (reference a.)
  - b. Production reports will be in Agent Report Format.

ANNEX A-Cover and Documentation (6)

ANNEX B-Communications (2)

ANNEX C-Finance and Logistics (2)

ANNEX D-Termination (C)

ANNEX E-Security Considerations (%)

ANNEX F-Knowledgeability List (U)

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
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ANNEX A - Cover and Documentation

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ANNEX B - Communication

## 1. (2)

#### Communication:

- a. Primary: The primary means of communication between the PCO and the source(s) will be personal meetings at selected safe sites in the Pentagon building or in the surrounding area of Northern Virginia or the District of Columbia. Personal meetings will be held to the absolute minimum consistent with operational requirements. Details of future meetings will be established at each meeting or through telephonic communication initiated by either the PCO or source(s) to previously exchanged telephone numbers.
- b. Emergency: To establish an unscheduled meeting on a priority basis, Source will call the PCO through an unlisted commercial number on the PCF/NCR FO call director. Source(s) will identify himself through a prearranged code name (cover name) and ask to speak to the PCO. If the PCO is not in available at the time of the call, the message will be transmitted to the PCO by PCF personnel as soon as possible. The PCO, to establish an unscheduled meeting with source(s), will contact source(s) by a pre-established telephone number in conformance with source(s) work schedule or off duty habits.

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Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.				
Information originated with another government agency. It have been referred to them for review and direct response to you.				
Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.				
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#### ANNEX D - Termination

1. (c) Termination of the operation: Termination will be accomplished based upon an objective evaluation of the effectiveness of continued utilization of source towards the accomplishment of the goals of this operation, with the final decision to terminate resting with OACSI, Department of the Army.

2. Termination of source(s) with prejudice: In the event source(s) violate basic security practices and are terminated for that reason, they will be prosecuted for violation of the appropriate statute or directive, should such an action be deemed feasible and advisable in connection with the nature of the violation and their activities in support of the operation. Should prosecution be inadvisable, source(s) will be required to execute a debriefing statement, and detailed instructions will be given regarding the possible consequences should they reveal their MI affiliations and activities.

3. (f) Termination of source(s) without prejudice: Upon termination of this operation or at such time as source(s) are considered to be of no further value within the scope of this plan, and provided source(s) have committed no flagrant violations of security, they will be paid all outstanding reimbursable expenses incurred. A detailed security briefing concerning disclosure of information concerning their MI affiliations and activities will also be administered. If deemed advisable at the time of termination, source(s) may be presented a properly sanitized letter of commendation/appreciation or other appropriate recognition for their cooperation.

4. (c) Commitments: No commitments other than those relating to reimbursement of legitimate operation expenses incurred during the course of the operation will be made. Source(s) will be given assurance of personal safety and protection of careers and reputations.

Knowledgeability: Source(s), during the course of the operation will be knowledgeable of the following:

- a. PCO: by name and status as Special Agent, US Army Intelligence.
- b. Facilities: Source(s) will not be routinely exposed to facilities housing PCF during the course of their covert activities. However, the existence of PCF is common knowledge throughout the Pentagon, and the likelihood that source(s) will, at a minimum, know the location of PCF is unavoidable.
- c. Modus Operandi: Source(s) will be exposed to modus operandi only in direct relation to the requirement levied by the PCO.
  - Location of meeting sites.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED and of alternate and emergency contact with PCO: Post Office ON SEP -5 1997
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Box numbers and locations and telephone numbers where PCO can be reached in an emergency.

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
ANNEX E - Security Considerations

1. (C) The activities engaged in by individuals assigned to OACSI which may be considered to be disruptive of military operations, contrary to good order and discipline, and posing a threat to military security are unknown at this time. The number of military personnel engaged in activities relative to active and/or passive resistance to the military is also unknown.

- a. The inter-relationship of military and civilian community in the National Capital area is such that it can be expected to present a degree of security risk in that confidential source(s) covert activities could be revealed through indiscretions on the part of source(s) in deviating from normal routine of activities normally associated with the work environment. This risk will be substantially limited by extensive training of source(s) in the areas of personal security and operational security. Further, close monitoring of all activities of source(s) for the purpose of determining the presence of or lack of derogatory security indicators will preclude unexpected security developments and will provide a means by which source(s) may be further trained, guided, and controlled in their activities.
- b. Project Control Officer/Confidential Source relationship could be revealed inadvertently by the passive element of the military establishment, thus posing a threat to the security of the operation. This possibility will be reduced by close adherence to fundamentals of security in the conduct of personal meetings, telephone calls, and all other contacts between PCO and source(s).
- 2. (C) In the event that either source(s) or this operation are compromised, USAINTA will not confirm the existence of such an operation, the employment of source(s), or interest in organizations/personalities involved in alleged subversive activities. Should source(s) be compromised PCO will immediately instruct source(s) to cease all operations; activity, and will debrief in detail concerning all aspects of the possible compromise. Based upon an evaluation of the situation, source(s) may be terminated and the operation may be suspended pending an analysis of the compromise and its ramifications. All sources so terminated will be administered the appropriate security debriefing.

 $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{F}}$  Security measures must assure:

- a. Strict need-to-know restructions concerning the existence of this operation and the methods by which it is implemented will be applied. A PCF Knowledgeability list will be maintained. (See ANNEX F)
- b. Briefings on the existence of this operation will be given only to the ACSI or his designated representative.



## ANNEX F - Knowledgeability List (U)

1.	LTC Byron W. Hunt	Commander, PCF
2.	MAJ Kenneth G. Hetzel	Operations Officer, PCF
3.	MSG Daniel W. Leber Jr	Operations NCOIC, PCF
4.	CPT Kenneth R. Schlag	PCF
5.	CW2 Shawn M. Sandlin	PCF
6.	CW2 Leonard NMN Gross	PCF
7.	SFC George E. Perry	PCF

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